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Abstract
Factitious disorder is classified as one of the five aspects of somatic symptom disorders. The fundamental element of factitious 
disorder is deception, i.e., pretending to have a medical or psychiatric disorder, but the enactment of deception is considered 
unconscious. Indeed, volition, i.e., the perception of deliberate deception, is blurred in patients presenting with factitious 
disorder. In the USA and the UK, factitious disorder has received constant media attention because of its forensic implica-
tions and outrageous costs for the National Health Systems. Unfortunately, a comparable level of attention is not present in 
Italian National Health System or the Italian mass media. The review analyzes the classifications, disorder mechanisms, costs, 
and medico-legal implications in the hope of raising awareness on this disturbing issue. Moreover, the review depicts 13 
exemplification cases, anonymized and fictionalized by expert writers. Finally, our paper also evaluates the National Health 
System’s expenditures for each patient, outlandish costs in the range between 50,000 and 1 million euros.
Keywords Factitious disorders · Malingering · Functional neurological symptoms disorder · Hysteria · Munchausen’s 
syndrome
Definitions and red flags
The factitious disorder is classified by DSM-5 [1] as one 
of the five aspects of somatic symptom disorders. This is at 
difference with the DSM IV-TR [2] version, which coded 
factitious disorder outside of somatoform disorders and edg-
ing dissociative disorders. Although the fundamental ele-
ment of factitious disorder is deception, i.e., pretending to 
suffer from a medical or psychiatric disorder, the enactment 
of deception is also considered unconscious. Indeed, the 
volitional aspect, i.e., perception of deliberate deception, is 
blurred in patients suffering from factitious disorders. There 
is no apparent economic purpose in patients with factitious 
disorder, at difference with malingering, which is considered 
willed fraudulent behavior [1, 2].
The disorder reached a definite identity only in the DSM 
III [3]. Therefore, related interpretations are likely biased 
by the previous insufficient separation from other somatic 
symptoms disorders and malingering. Before the DSM III, 
factitious disorder and malingering were considered present 
mainly in the military (drafted personnel) and criminal world 
[4, 5]. For some authors, a catalyst of factitious disorder and 
malingering was the creation of social welfare and the access 
to financial compensations or unnecessary care [6].
According to the early presentation of the disorder [7], 
in the DSM IV, factitious disorder was also termed Mun-
chausen syndrome. The DSM-5 now disfavors its use. The 
reasons to opt for other terms are discussed in detail by Feld-
man and Yates [6], where attention is focused on the need to 
highlight the abusive behavior in legal terms.
The core definitions of factitious disorder are that “are 
conditions in which a patient intentionally produces or feigns 
physical or psychological symptoms…without obvious 
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secondary gain (ICD-10 definition).” [8] The DSM-5 states 
that “the motivation for the behavior is to assume the sick 
role” but, although deception and feigning are the core 
element for the diagnosis, the manuals also indicate that 
“assessment of conscious intention is unreliable” and 
diagnosis is linked to the chance to incur into evidence of 
feigning [1]. Therefore, guidelines indicate that deception 
and the absence of external incentives for the behavior are 
diagnostic criteria. However, paradoxically, the same guide-
lines state that the intention of feigning cannot be reliably 
assessed. The DSM IV-TR [2] also provided a detailed guide 
(red flag, indicating that the presence of specific behaviors 
should alert the clinics to suspect a factitious origin) for 
differential diagnosis. “Suspicion that an apparent mental 
disorder or general medical condition in fact represents facti-
tious disorder should be aroused if any combination of the 
following is noted in a hospitalized individual: an atypical 
or dramatic presentation that does not conform to an iden-
tifiable general medical condition or mental disorder; pseu-
dologia fantastica (pathological lying); disruptive behavior 
on the ward (e.g. noncompliance with hospital regulations, 
arguing excessively with nurses and physicians); extensive 
knowledge of medical terminology and hospital routines; 
covert use of substances; evidence of multiple treatment 
interventions (e.g. repeated surgery); extensive history of 
traveling; a fluctuating clinical course, with rapid develop-
ment of “complications” or new “pathology” once the initial 
workup proves to be negative.”
Factitious disorder may also appear as a “by proxy” 
behavior, termed as “Munchausen Syndrome by proxy” [9]. 
In this case, the quest for medical attention is transposed 
to people (often children) cared for by the person with fac-
titious disorder. Using drugs or physical manipulations or 
direct poisoning, the perpetrator induces sick conditions to 
persons of whose care he/she is charged. Recently, a substi-
tution of “Munchausen Syndrome by proxy” with “Medical 
Child Abuse” has been proposed with the aim, again, to 
address the legal aspects of the condition [10, 11].
Because pathological lying (pseudologia fantastica) is a 
critical component of the disorder, it is argued that the cli-
nician should actively seek its identification. Pathological 
lying is distinguished from “normal” lying by several char-
acteristics, including recurrent, enduring, and compulsive lie 
presentations as well as fantastic, self-aggrandizing content 
and the possible ego-dystonic structure with maladaptive or 
destructive outcomes for the quality of life of the pathologi-
cal liar [12, 13].
Factitious disorders may appear in association with other 
mental disorders. The DSM-5 [1] quotes the association with 
the other four somatic symptoms disorders (i.e., the somatic 
symptoms disorder-Briquet syndrome, the conversion-func-
tional neurologic disorder, illness anxiety disorder-hypo-
chondria, psychological symptoms occurring during other 
medical conditions) and with dissociative disorders. The 
DSM IV-TR [2] includes histrionic, antisocial, borderline, 
and dependent personality disorders. The DSM-5 goes to the 
extent of stating that “some aspects of factitious disorders 
might represent criminal behavior.”
The recent neurologic literature has proposed a clear-cut 
separation of conversion/functional neurologic disorders 
(FND) from factitious disorders [14, 15]. However, as men-
tioned above, the DSM classification system underlines the 
frequent overlap between different forms of somatic symp-
tom disorders, once termed hysteria and, therefore, a hys-
tero-malingering continuum has been suggested [12, 16].
Studies analyzing the occurrence of somatizations in 
adopted patients and their biological parents indicated that the 
somatization disorder was associated with heritable personality 
traits like predisposition to antisocial behavior and substance 
abuse [17–19]. Thus, the antisocial trait (and possible further 
evolutions to criminal behavior) is an aspect of the factitious/
malingering continuum that should not be overlooked.
Factitious disorder is not rare; epidemiological studies 
show that 1% of referrals to psychiatry liaison services in 
hospitals exhibit the disorder [20]. Around one-third of the 
perpetrators of medical child abuse (by proxy disorder) have 
factitious disorder themselves [21].
Factitious disorder has been extensively studied in the USA 
and the UK. These studies have highlighted the outrageous 
costs to the healthcare systems [20, 22]. In Italy, less than 40 
single case reports have been published so far, all exclusively 
reporting “by proxy” cases of medical child abuse [23]. (results 
of PUBMED search for, Factitious, Munchausen, Italy).
The present study aims to call attention to this disorder 
and estimate the costs to our healthcare system. The cases 
reported here are taken from our Neurology Clinic, but facti-
tious disorders have a great impact on the clinical practice 
of all the other medical disciplines. For instance, factitious 
disorder commonly overlaps with brittle diabetes, dermatitis 
factitia, and gastroenterological presentations [18, 24].
Psychodynamic mechanisms
Psychodynamic interpretations describe primary gain (i.e., 
the solution of an intrapsychic conflict) as the origin of fac-
titious disorder. In contrast, secondary gain, which is the 
practical or economic benefits resulting from the enactment 
of specific behavior, is typically associated with malinger-
ing [25]. Primary gain has been described as keeping an 
internal conflict or need out of personal insight. Secondary 
gain is instead associated with avoiding a particular activity 
that is noxious. Secondary gain also aims at getting support 
from the environment that otherwise might not be forth-
coming. However, the primary gain has also been linked to 
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Conversion disorders, to the point that several studies depict 
a continuum [10].
Psychodynamic studies highlight that “factitious disor-
ders are famously difficult to treat medically and are highly 
refractory to psychotherapy.” [25] Only a few reports 
have successfully described the interaction between the 
therapist and patient affected by factitious disorder; many 
authors have concluded that genuine communication is 
difficult and almost always burdened by deception and 
opposition. Some authors have also described confronta-
tional management [18] issues once deception is unveiled. 
Many authors underlined oppositive and defiant responses 
to attempts to rationalize and explain the behavior to the 
patient. An unfruitful attempt, constantly resulting in the 
patient’s question: “what if that’s true?” [8, 20].
An intriguing report, produced from a rare collaborative 
patient, described herself in a psychotherapy session as “des-
perate to try and get help” [18]. She wrote: “I despise myself 
for all the things I have done, and have endlessly tried to stop 
what it is like an addiction.” Similar descriptions can also be 
found in a recent book by Feldman and Yates [6].
The unconscious origin of the feigning behavior is inter-
preted as the hidden drive to be in control of medical condi-
tions that were previously experienced as painful. In this 
respect, these disorders can also be viewed as repetitive 
compulsions motivated by the desire to dominate and master 
(i.e., taking control over) the medical personnel providing 
care [25]. Feigning, or inflicting damages to a proxy (per-
formed in a state of blurred consciousness), can be inter-
preted as the expression of unconscious wishes to enact a 
personal drama and reinforce the strength of a relationship 
with medical professionals who live in the fantasy of the 
patient [18, 26]. In the 1978 draft of the DSM III, [3] the 
underlying motive of factitious disorder was presented as the 
compulsion to act out a sadomasochistic relationship with 
physicians who are regarded as parental figures [6].
A current revaluation of the majority of psychodynamic 
interpretations produced before that DSM III [3] often 
unveils a mixture of somatic symptoms (conversion or func-
tional neurologic disorders (FND)) and factitious disorder 
exhibited by the same patient (hence the reiterated concept 
of a continuum) [16, 18, 20].
The psychodynamic model of reference invokes an uncon-
scious mechanism that acts independently of the patient con-
sciousness, thereby favoring the assumption that a disordered 
unconscious might give rise to a disordered will [25].
From these hypotheses, an unconscious intention to 
action would rely on a simultaneous (conscious) intention to 
act. Within this frame, Lacanian interpretations introduced 
the concept of “failed acts” either as identification with an 
external will or as “acting in” within a fantasized body space 
to explain the production of FND motor symptoms or the 
complex activities enacted in factitious disorder [27].
Further interpretations were focused on self-decep-
tion, avowal, and disavowal of action. These suggested 
that disavowal of action [28] is acted to avoid disturb-
ing the patient’s image of his/herself. Thus, the action 
becomes not intended as its access to consciousness is 
barred [28–30]. The concept of avowal could not sepa-
rate FND from feigning. Unsurprisingly, the dissection of 
volition led to discussing moral contents, distinguishing 
an unconscious, morally neutral deception where it is the 
self and not the other, whom the deceiver is deceiving, 
from a deception being a willed act, which should then be 
pure malingering.
These interpretations blurred the boundaries between 
FND and factitious disorder, and, again, a possible con-
tinuum was suggested, termed “hystero-malingering con-
tinuum” [12] (Fig. 1). For example, it was shown that hys-
teric patients misinterpret evidence and selectively pay 
attention to only a specific part of the overall evidence. 
Patients who employ such strategies as positive and nega-
tive misinterpretations, selective attention, and selective 
evidence gathering are biased (driven by primary, second-
ary, and economic gains) and can become, therefore, self-
deceiving [29].
Fig. 1  The presence of a medical condition can often mesh with 
deception and somatization. The fictionalized cases presented in the 
paper, unveil a mixture of somatic symptoms (conversion or func-
tional neurologic disorders (FND)) and factitious disorder that co-
exist in the same patients, thereby supporting the hypothesis of a hys-
tero-malingering continuum. Reproduced, with modifications, from 
Feldman and Yates, 2018
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Other potential mechanisms
First in philosophy (as in work by Hume) [31], and later 
in psychology, three main elements of voluntary (willed) 
actions were considered. These elements are either (a) voli-
tion, or will, defined as the power to order the forbearing 
of an idea; (b) agency, as the perception of being the one 
who chooses or enacts the action; and (c) intention, as the 
conscious choice generated by the agent of the action. For 
example, intention, volition, and agency to act but no motor 
effects are present in organic paresis. Conversely, in utiliza-
tion and imitation behaviors (driven by frontal dysfunction), 
no intention or volition is intended, whereas agency is per-
ceived. In some sensory deafferentation conditions, like the 
posterior alien hand syndrome, the sense of agency is lost.
Based on these three categories, several attempts have 
been made to demonstrate structural or functional cor-
relates of feigned acts or motor disorders ascribed to psy-
chogenic causes.
Initially, the focus has been on volition “they say, I 
cannot; it looks like I will not; but it is I cannot will.” 
Therefore, manifestations of unconscious actions were 
interpreted as driven by disordered will (Paget, 1873) [32].
More recently, the focus has shifted on altered agency 
[15, 33, 34], which was considered the expression of disordered 
perceptions and altered by insufficient suppression of priors 
recruited by top-down perception processing [33–35].
Attention to the motor act, as part of intention, has been also 
invoked, to explain the distractibility of FND and feigned motor 
disorders. It must be pointed out that when invoking the concept 
of attention, a paradox surfaces. The maintenance of uncon-
sciously derived FND symptoms requires in fact conscious 
attention [36, 37]. The main diagnostic method for dissecting out 
a functional motor disorder is based on testing the distractibility 
of the symptom, i.e., if the patient is distracted, the functional 
or feigned symptom must disappear. However, this finding also 
indicates that attention is needed to produce the symptom. As 
attention is part of conscious behavior, the paradox emerges. 
Indeed, contrary to the construct’s supporting assumption, it is 
the patient insight and awareness that maintain the symptom’s 
production. The same interpretation can be applied to the agency 
of the act of feigning in factitious disorder.
Different reports have suggested dysfunctions in top-down 
processes. However, the lack of statistically powered studies 
makes these findings still largely anecdotical [14, 15, 33, 38].
More recent interpretations suggested that factitious disorder 
should be considered based on the mechanisms of addiction or 
duress (i.e., like in pathological gambling) [39].
In patients with factitious disorders, the agency of feigning 
and volition of feigning is denied and erased from conscious-
ness; intention should be consequently unconscious.
Much needed research should be invested to identify the neu-
ral substrates of deception in factitious disorder, an ambitious 
target not achieved so far [20, 40, 41].
Anonymized representative cases
All cases described here went through anonymization and have 
been fictionalized by expert writers (age, gender, profession, his-
tory, initials, are all fictional. The original observational studies 
were approved by the local ethical committee (number 16 of 
19/Jul/2018 ,emendment 7/May/2020 and number 2098 of 11/
Jun/2020).
Case 1: AA male, 35 years old
After four previous admissions in other Italian Neurology Clin-
ics, AA came to our observation, asking for muscle and nerve 
biopsy. The patient complained of leg weakness, with the impos-
sibility to walk and stand, and unclear sensory disturbance in 
the absence of pain. He specifically claimed to suffer from an 
unknown muscle or peripheral nerve disease. Objective neuro-
logical examination showed normal segmental strength, normal 
trophism, and normal deep reflexes. Electromyography/neurog-
raphy (EMG/ENG) and motor and sensory evoked potentials 
were normal. The medical history revealed previous litigation 
for medical malpractice (abdominal surgery) that resulted in 
monetary compensation at the age of 18.
The patient’s attitude was highly hostile with doctors and 
nurses. He also attempted manipulatory strategies with the 
medical staff and repeatedly threatened to start a malpractice 
suit. One night, he was eventually found by nurses standing in 
the bathroom.
Immediately dismissed, with a diagnosis of Munchausen 
syndrome, he still managed to arrange a private transferal to 
another neurology clinic. In the following year, he was admitted 
to four more neurology clinics, always pretending to be cured 
and studied for his unknown disease. Meanwhile, he obtained 
nationwide attention from several newspapers and calling for 
an effort of the scientific community to find a diagnosis. After 
almost another year of repeated hospital admissions, he disap-
peared from media and social network websites.
In 18 months, AA totalized 370 days of hospital stay and 
underwent repeated clinical and instrumental examinations, with 
an estimated cost for the community of 512,000 euro, this not-
withstanding the cost of the emotional stress for personnel staff.
Case 2: BB, female, 54 years old
BB was the mother and caregiver of a 26-year-old girl affected 
by refractory epilepsy. At the age of 4, the girl had presented 
with seizures, probable partial or generalized status, which 
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were not recognized by the pediatrician. For this reason, BB 
had obtained congruous compensation from the hospital. Since 
then, she toured several epilepsy clinics in the country, asking 
for different interventions, including epilepsy surgery of differ-
ent kinds.
When she came to our clinic, the girl had undergone bilateral 
temporal lobectomy, callosotomy, tracheostomy, and percutane-
ous gastrostomy (PEG), and was unable to stand unaided. BB’s 
daughter was under treatment with phenobarbital, clobazam, 
felbamate, carbamazepine, valproate, and vagal stimulator. BB 
complained that the girl was still suffering from seizures or sta-
tus. Ingestion pneumonia was detected at admission. During the 
hospital stay, BB pretended to be the only one to administer 
drugs to the girl.
Her attitude was extremely hostile and aggressive. She also 
expected to have constant attention, tried to foster rivalries 
among the doctors, and violently targeted some doctors. On 
repeated occasions, she physically attacked a neurologist, two 
nurses, and a pneumologist.
During the stay, therapy was adjusted, reduced to felbamate 
and stiripentol, and seizure frequency decreased to less than once 
a week. The patient’s level of consciousness improved, with non-
verbal interactions, also with the resolution of pneumonia, and a 
genetic diagnosis of Dravet’s syndrome was provided.
BB was then sued by the attacked doctors and by the head of 
the clinic. A month after dismissal, we were informed that the 
girl had died because of pneumonia. We eventually got to know 
from the welfare assistants that BB was feeding her daughter 
with solid food per os, despite every warning.
The diagnosis was Munchausen by proxy. There is still 
uncertainty on which would have been the girl’s conditions if 
the mother had not succeeded in obtaining the multiple surgical 
procedures.
The cost of medical procedures is estimated to exceed 1 mil-
lion euros.
Case 3: CC, female, 28 years old at first referral, now 
52 years old
CC came to our observation because of seizures, which had 
been classified as “jocular” by the most prominent epileptolo-
gist of the time. Never any epileptic activity was documented by 
Electroencephalogram (EEG). During the first and subsequent 
stays, she reported being affected by dissociative identity disor-
ders, with three different personalities coexisting in her body at 
different times. One was a wild, sexy, uncontrolled personality, 
accustomed to having all her wishes fulfilled. One was a cul-
tivated lady, a professor of literature, and the third was a low 
social level housewife.
In her first stay, CC jumped through the clinic’s glass door, 
attacked the nurses and doctors, and presented with 2–5 psycho-
genic non-epileptic seizures (PNES) per day. After a thorough 
diagnostic workout, no evidence of seizures was documented. 
CC slowly began to manifest her inner beliefs, always exhibiting 
a defiant attitude and constant menaces of suing the doctors for 
malpractice. Although emergency treatments with haloperidol 
or chlorpromazine had, temporarily, contained her histrionic 
behaviors, she refused any chronic drug or psychotherapeutic 
treatment.
Her disruptive behaviors prompted, throughout the years, 
several other admissions. CC filed several accusations of mal-
practice and requests for compensation.
She was followed by the social services of the clinic for more 
than 30 years, as she had been abandoned by the family and lost 
any economic support.
The diagnosis was histrionic personality disorder and Mun-
chausen syndrome.
The total cost of her hospital admissions was more than 
600,000 euros.
Case 4: DD, female, 39 years old
After a minor head trauma due to a traffic accident, DD pre-
sented with amnesias, confusional state, dreamy states, and 
fugues, for which she refused to return to work and persuaded a 
lawyer to sue for dementia secondary to head trauma.
Extensive workouts could not document any brain lesion. At 
the visits, she was hostile and defiant, menacing legal actions, 
and pretended to have several neurologic disturbances, includ-
ing absences, postural instability, knee buckling, and amnesia. 
During a PNES, she presented with the hysteric arch and pelvic 
thrusting.
Repeated attempts to obtain medical and legal attention per-
sisted for 18 months, even though she had already returned to her 
work. She refused medical and psychotherapeutic treatments.
The diagnosis was malingering and factitious disorder.
The cost of her hospital stay, medical workup, and procedures 
was 50,000 euros.
Case 5: EE, female, 42 years old
EE reportedly suffered from (undocumented) epilepsy with less 
than two seizures per year since her childhood. She had been 
treated with valproate and carbamazepine until the age of 24, 
without any recurrence. At the age of 41, EE had accepted to 
follow her husband, who had been offered a career promotion, to 
an overseas subsidiary of the central factory. In the new country, 
she started presenting with convulsive and non-convulsive sei-
zures, with increasing frequency (from weekly to several times 
per day). Interictal EEG showed right frontotemporal sharp 
waves and isolated spike-slow waves. Therefore, treatment was 
reintroduced with lamotrigine, followed by topiramate.
At the admission to our clinic, the extensive workout only 
documented PNES, with no ictal discharges during video-
EEG. Magnetic resonance imaging and interictal perfusion, 
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single-photon emission computed tomography results were 
normal. The seizure’s phenomenology changed progressively 
with time. DD started to present fugue states with automatisms, 
accompanied by oppositive behaviors and falls, and rolling on 
the floor.
The diagnosis of PNES was not accepted by the patient and, 
initially, also by the husband. She refused psychotherapy.
The cost of ascertainments and hospital stays was 50,000 
euro.
The diagnosis was factitious disorder. However, the second-
ary gain was achieved as she forced her husband to return to the 
country of origin. The follow-up was, nonetheless, unfortunate, 
with a divorce occurring after 3 years.
Case 6: FF, male, 36 years old
FF presented with paraparesis due to a workplace accidental 
fall. After the lower back trauma, only an L2 internal rim of 
fracture was documented at MRI. FF then filed a legal action 
for reimbursement. The suit was opposed by the National Insti-
tute providing coverage for inability resulting from trauma at 
work, but the opposition was countered by several appeals, pro-
tracted for 5 years. During this time, paraparesis converted to 
paraplegia, and urinary incontinence appeared, which prompted 
catheterization.
At the evaluation in our clinic, FF presented on a wheel-
chair with leg extensions, a condition which he claimed had 
lasted for 5 years. The neurological examination showed normal 
segmental strength, absent plantar reflexes, and ankle clonus 
(three jerks) only on the right. EMG/ENG, MEP, and SEP were 
normal. Trophism examination only showed mild redness of 
the skin over the sacrum, no decubitus. Urine samples were 
completely normal, despite the pretended use of permanent 
catheterization.
The diagnosis was malingering-factitious disorder. However, 
FF’s lawyers obtained a settlement with the insurance company 
to end the repeated appeals. The reimbursement was for 300,000 
euros, 70% of which went to the lawyers.
Case 7: GG male, 46 years old
GG presented with right eye optic neuritis (ON) at the age of 40. 
The acute phase was timely treated with boluses of methylpred-
nisolone and subsided over 15 days. The recovery at 6 months 
seemed incomplete, with the persistence of a superior altitudi-
nal field defect. However, this picture was more consistent with 
sector ischemic optic neuropathy than with inflammatory ON. 
Repeated MRI brain scans only showed persistent hyperinten-
sity of the inferior right optic nerve at STIR, LTIR, and FLAIR 
sequences. No demyelinating lesions were ever observed within 
the brain or the spinal cord.
During the following 5 years, GG presented with 12 more 
episodes of right or bilateral orbital pain, frontal pain, neck pain 
accompanied by severe agitation, stress reactions, and hostile 
attitudes. Moreover, also his wife aggressively addressed the 
doctors, pretending to have immediate treatments and attention 
for her husband, menacing to use her acquaintances in various 
national newspapers to divulge on the press the “negligent” 
treatment.
Repeated visual field examinations showed inconsistent and 
variable/remitting changes, and visual evoked potentials (VEP) 
did not show any change after the first episode. Moreover, event-
related potentials showed a P300 potential elicited by rare stim-
uli, also when he was pretending to be blind from the right eye. 
Screening for anti-aquaporin and anti-MOG antibodies, along 
with genetic studies for Leber’s hereditary optic neuropathy, was 
negative.
Nevertheless, GG’s pain episodes and his wife’s menaces 
continued. He finally succeeded in getting a written diagnosis 
supporting severe visual impairment and used it to obtain eco-
nomic support and pension.
The diagnosis was Munchausen by proxy associated with 
chronic paroxysmal hemicrania, and panic attacks, in prior 
ischemic optic neuritis. Psychiatric treatment was refused.
The costs of repeated access to the multiple sclerosis unit 
and unnecessary methylprednisolone boluses (until the diagno-
sis was ascertained and treatment denied) were 25,000 euros. 
The cost of a pension for severe blindness, if approved, would 
be 12,000 euros per year, to be extended for his life expectancy.
Case 8: FF, female, 58 years old
At the age of 50, FF presented with distal leg weakness and 
lower limb areflexia. After a complete workout, she was then 
diagnosed with chronic inflammatory demyelinating polyneu-
ropathy (CIDP) and treated with methylprednisone followed by 
intravenous immunoglobulin (IVIG) infusions.
After the initial clinical improvement, lasting for 6 months, 
FF complained of the disorder’s relapses and worsening of the 
distal weakness. The conduction parameters at ENG were not 
changed (a possible outcome, as described by literature, which 
could be disjunct from clinical improvement). The amplitude of 
compound muscle action potential was not furtherly decreased. 
However, because of the subjective, untestable complaint of a 
relapse, a new IVIG course was administered, followed by clini-
cal improvement. From the second treatment, FF complained of 
further relapses with a yearly/biannual frequency and received 
treatments (despite some clinicians’ opposition, of which the 
patient was not informed).
In the following admissions, she became the terror of the 
clinical unit. She exhibited continuous complaints about delays 
in treatment, inadequate attention from doctors and nurses, inad-
equate room furniture quality, poor entertainment during the 
time spent in the treatment unit, and excessive noise. She suc-
cessfully filed several written complaints to the hospital admin-
istration, to the press, to the “Tribunal of Patients’ Rights”. She 
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explained that her complaints were made to improve the service 
for everybody and often harangued the other patients waiting for 
treatment, inviting them to produce a “class action.” She refused 
any psychiatric approach and treatment.
Her hostile and viscous attitude prompted a diagnosis of 
Munchausen syndrome in narcissistic personality disorder.
The cost of IVIG treatments was 240,000 euros, and the emo-
tional cost of his continuous complaints and harassment was 
incalculable.
Case 9: GG, male, 69 years old
Affected by bipolar disorder, once condemned for sexual harass-
ment, GG was in treatment with lithium and haloperidol. He was 
admitted to our Neurology Clinic for iatrogenic Parkinsonism, 
which rapidly subsided with therapy adjustment. Three years 
later, he had a traffic accident with head trauma, but a neuro-
logic evaluation performed 6 months later showed no pathologic 
signs.
However, his daughter, a lawyer, filed a compensation request 
for dementia and Parkinsonism due to the head trauma. Subse-
quent visits showed severe bilateral Parkinsonism, with tremor, 
bradykinesia, and postural instability. The evaluation also docu-
mented bradyphrenia, untestable mental status, and cognitive 
levels due to lack of collaboration, dysarthria, poor word articu-
lation, and hyperphonia. The discrepancy of the dysarthria type 
with Parkinsonism and his medical history prompted in-depth 
neuroimaging studies. These showed medial temporal atrophy 
of grade 2 and reduced binding in the left striatum at Ioflupane 
123I DAT-scan, which were deemed irrelevant for the litigation.
At the visit, the neurologist suspected that dysarthria and 
bradyphrenia were due to concealed administration of neuro-
leptics. The daughter, who was also in charge of medications, 
denied any administration of neuroleptics and threatened all 
kinds of legal actions against the clinical and forensic doctors.
Despite a clear report by the neurologist, the daughter suc-
ceeded in molesting and menacing the insurance company doc-
tors and lawyers and finally obtained compensation for 500,000 
euro.
This case is a mixture of fraudulent behavior and factitious 
disorder by proxy, deliberately orchestrated to obtain undeserved 
monetary benefits.
Case 10: HH, female, 69 years old
HH had been evaluated and treated for hypomania/maniac state 
and depression episodes 10 to 15 years before the occurrence of 
a traffic accident, which caused a leg fracture and head trauma 
with transitory loss of consciousness, no bleeding.
Three months after the trauma, while treated in rehabilita-
tion, she presented with bizarre agitation behaviors, restless-
ness, aggressivity, and confusional states. She filed a request 
for compensation for dementia due to head trauma. Once at 
home, she presented with disinhibited behavior, aggressivity, 
and fugues. Her behavior prompted several neurologic exami-
nations, which provided contradictory results, with inconsisten-
cies and lack of collaboration during neuropsychological tests. 
Fluctuating cognition was evidenced, intelligence quotient (IQ) 
scores varied from 70 to 98, mini-mental state examination score 
ranged from 10 to 23, and frontal assessment battery scores from 
3 to 12. Approximate answers (Vorbereiden) and somatic con-
version features (waning left hemiparesis) were also noted, and 
a diagnosis of Ganser syndrome was provided. HH refused any 
psychiatric approach, pretending to have the neurologic report 
canceled.
The litigation with the insurance company ran for 3 years. 
In the end, she obtained compensation of 200,000 euros and a 
pension from the National Institute for Accidents at Work due 
to “frontal lobe lesions.” Four years after the compensation, all 
the disorders had disappeared.
The diagnosis was for factitious disorder with mimicked 
Ganser syndrome. The recovery after time suggests that the 
syndrome was simulated as the Ganser pseudodementia is fol-
lowed by dementia.
Case 11: JJ, male, 34 years old at first referral, now 
58 years old
At the age of 34, working as a carpenter, JJ fell from a 3-m-high 
scaffold on his feet. D8 vertebral body fracture was evidenced by 
computed tomography (CT) scan. He subsequently developed 
intense pain, urinary retention, and flaccid paraparesis, and was 
rehabilitated for 1 year. Afterward, JJ recovered from flaccid 
paraparesis, regained the ability to walk unaided, normal bladder 
functions, and normal sexual life. However, he complained of 
severe back pain with myoclonic spasms.
He received monetary compensation for the accident and 
a temporary pension. He never returned to work, as he com-
plained of continuous, unbearable back pain. For the pain, 
he was treated by pain medicine units with analgesics, opi-
ates, and finally with a spinal electric stimulator implant. Six 
years after the implant, he requested to remove the electrodes 
as he felt that there was no effect and wanted to explore new 
treatment options. He was then addressed for the first time 
to our neurology unit. The patient presented in a wheelchair, 
reporting to be unable to walk for more than two steps. The 
neurologist found normal segmental strength, normal plantar 
reflexes, normal tendon, and superficial reflexes. Epicritic 
and thermal sensitivity was normal, but he complained of 
severe pain for pinprick stimuli of the back, from level C5 to 
sacral metamers. Pinprick stimuli and bending of the back 
elicited diffuse spasms with leg retraction, flexion spasms of 
the trunk and legs, and pleurotonus, lasting for 10 to 40 s. 
Because of the incongruence between the stimulated metam-
ers and the elicited spasms, the condition was diagnosed as 
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propriospinal myoclonus. The definite confirmation of the 
functional nature of symptoms came from assessing agonist 
and antagonist muscle co-contractions at the EMG. It was 
also supported by the presence of distractibility with enter-
tainment maneuvers and the presence of readiness potentials 
that preceded the spasms. A revaluation of the personal his-
tory and hospital charts confirmed that propriospinal myo-
clonus had been the only symptom ever presented.
Attempts to explain to JJ the origin of the condition and 
provide psychotherapy were accompanied by combative 
opposition and aggression. The patient refused any psycho-
therapy and physiotherapy. Crossover controls showed that, 
throughout the years, the patient had kept his driving license, 
maintained an active social life, and worked, illegally but 
regularly, in a company owned by a close relative.
In total, compensation for the accident, pain treatments, 
and disability pension summed up to 1 million euros.
The case represents a mixture of functional and factitious 
disorder and plain malingering.
Case 12: KK, male, 46 years old
In his late adolescence, KK presented with sporadic 
migraine episodes, which increased in frequency to became 
bimonthly from age 35 to 45. After two distressing life 
events in his affective and professional life, the headache 
episodes became daily. The symptom consisted of bitempo-
ral pain, irradiated to the jaw, accompanied by facial spasms 
and hypophonic voice. Repeated laryngoscopies did not 
show any abnormality. Facial spasms consisted of normal 
voluntary activity. Logopedic treatments were unsuccessful. 
He refused psychotherapy and presented with variegate side 
effects whenever pharmacologic treatment was attempted. 
For his disorder, he toured several neurology clinics all 
over the country, angrily complaining about the inefficacy 
of treatments. After the last negative laryngoscopy and neck 
imaging study, he requested a laryngeal muscle EMG, which 
the neurologist denied. The denial was followed by a wors-
ening of facial spasms and hypophonia, which was reduced 
to constant whispering. Legal actions aimed at forcing the 
neurologist to perform the exam and at obtaining compensa-
tion for the worsening of symptoms were initiated.
In this case, the initial symptoms were functional and 
somatic symptoms disorders, but eventually, a factitious dis-
order emerged. The approximate cost of all the performed 
exams and visits was about 50,000 euros.
Case 13: LL, female, 48 years old
LL accessed the neurology clinic after 2 years of repeated 
neurological evaluations. She lamented weakness (and exhib-
ited dystonic posture) of the left arm and cognitive decline. 
She, however, normally moved the arm during distracting 
conversations, and no signs of neurologic disorders were 
ascertained. CT, MRI, and positron emission tomography 
(PET) brain scans, as well as lumbar puncture and further pro-
teomics for the investigation of inflammatory disorders, were 
normal. While on the medical ward, she enacted distressing 
behaviors, calling for doctors’ and nurses’ continuous atten-
tion, threatening to sue for negligent or incompetent medi-
cal assistance, complaining of insufficient facilities (Wi-Fi, 
TV programs, lack of a private room). LL lamented several 
falls, which were never observed by nurses and physicians. LL 
also pretended to have delivered medical documents, which 
were never provided. A search for previous access to medical 
facilities showed that she had been seen in different hospitals’ 
medical wards. It also unveiled a complex history that had 
produced widespread support by social support services. She 
was the single mother of a 10-year-old girl and a 27-year-
old boy who had moved to another town and had not kept 
contact for 10 years. The 10-year-old girl was compelled to 
behave like a caregiver, watching for her care, and instructed 
to call the emergency services at night if she appeared to have 
respiratory difficulties. Actually, the girl had often called the 
medical ward, yet never any disorder was observed.
Costs for medical ascertainments and repeated accesses 
to medical facilities were above 50,000 euro.
This case presented with elements of functional and fac-
titious disorders and borderline personality disorder, and 
shows the harbinger of a possible “by proxy” disorder.
Management
General agreement concurs that these disorders are mostly 
untreatable [25], or that psychotherapy is ineffective, other than 
being mostly refused. This is not unexpected, given the fraudu-
lent nature of some of the enacted behaviors [25].
However, there is a management issue, as patients who are 
admitted to medical facilities must be confronted with the diag-
nosis of factitious disorder. Until now, no better approach was 
devised than the supportive confrontation of the patient by two 
or more members of the medical staff, and possibly the involve-
ment of a psychiatric colleague, after careful preparation [6, 18, 
42]. Anger, hostility, and irritation, which are common among 
the clinicians involved, as induced by the hostile attitudes of 
patients, should be tempered by the preparatory meetings [6, 
12].
Face saving is considered the key element for the manage-
ment confrontation, i.e., it is essential for the patient to be able 
to explain a recovery, or dismission from a medical facility, to 
themselves and family members, without admitting the psychi-
atric nature of the problem [6, 12, 43].
When confronted with the evidence of their deception, 
patients typically react with denial, aggression, or threats of 
legal actions. The doctor-patient relationship is irreparable [6].
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The concept of tertiary gain is also relevant in this context 
[20, 44, 45]. Tertiary gain occurs when a third subject gains from 
the perpetuation of the patient’s symptoms. Typical examples 
include family members who hope to gain financially, physi-
cians who want to recruit patients, and some plaintiff lawyers. 
Therefore, the confrontation must consider that different sorts 
of secondary and tertiary gain may be at stake. Even in patients 
who develop factitious disorder as a defense strategy to get pri-
mary gain, a secondary gain may appear as they realize that the 
illness can bring it. A tertiary gain may follow as part of the 
surrounding context.
Collecting the evidence for deceit is most often difficult. In 
the USA and the UK, hidden video recordings (covert video 
recording, CVR) of patients in their daily life are a common 
practice and supported by regulatory procedures. In our country, 
we are unaware of any authorization for video recordings, not 
even in cases acted with suspected criminal purposes. However, 
even in the USA and the UK, the attorneys for the accused hos-
pitals or physicians often avoid CVR as they feel that settle-
ments might cost less than a trial, and settlements are frequently 
reached [46–48].
In the USA and the UK, collateral tests have been developed 
to reach evidence of deception. These tests are termed “symp-
tom validity tests” or “effort tests” and focused on the ascertain-
ment of pathological lying. In legal parlance, the evidence of 
lying calls into question the patient’s credibility [20]. One of the 
most employed is the “coin-in-the-hand test” for patients with 
amnesia [49]. All are based on probabilistic natures, assuming 
that any result in a test, which is inferior to results expected by 
random answering, indicates that the individual intentionally 
chooses to get answers wrong. These tests, however, may only 
show the likelihood of willful non-cooperation but cannot prove 
it [49]. Although these tests have been used, in the USA and the 
UK, in forensic medicine, as surrogate evidence of lying, their 
applicability is far from definite.
The cost on public health and legal systems
The 13 cases provide examples of abnormal behaviors ranging 
from criminal and fraudulent conduct to unconscious presen-
tations, possibly associated with a grandiose interpretation of 
oneself and the desire for mastery of medical figures.
The cases also recapitulate the various clinical presentation 
found in the literature, like “by proxy” behaviors, psychiatric 
comorbidity, the relevance of previous experiences of com-
pensation, the switch from initial somatic symptom disorder to 
factitious disorder with belligerent opposition once confronta-
tion was attempted, the overlap/overlay of factitious disorder 
to coexisting medical (neurologic) diseases, and the blurred 
borders between factitious and malingering. Of note, it must be 
considered that unnecessary treatments and investigations may 
place patients at risk of iatrogenic complications and even death. 
In American medical literature, cases are reported of patients 
repeatedly presenting with pseudo-epileptic seizures or status 
who died because of treatment, as described in a book recently 
published by the most recognized psychiatric expert of factitious 
disorder and malingering [6]. For the many cases reported, close 
similarities with the cases here described are outstanding. The 
book also provides evidence of cyber-deception [39] or “Mun-
chausen by Internet,” documenting the fraudulent enactment of 
secondary and tertiary gain, collecting undeserved donations.
In our case descriptions, what was not reported is the amount 
of time devoted by medical doctors to unnecessary care. It 
should be a reminder that, in Italy, the National Healthcare sys-
tem is based on a coding system that categorizes all the dis-
eases divided for each medical specialty (DRG, diagnosis related 
group) [50]. The coding is key to regulate the amount that the 
Ministry of Health reimburses to the hospital for any given 
disease. The DRG does not recognize factitious disorder (nor 
any somatic symptom disorder) with the neurology category. 
Therefore, any care provided to patients with factitious disorder 
is not reimbursed, resulting in a net economic loss. Finally, what 
is overlooked is the amount of time wasted by medical doctors 
to defend themselves from illogical or fraudulent allegations, a 
hidden economic cost neglected by legal litigations.
Our report documents the costs of factitious disorders, which 
are not adequately recognized by the legal system. It also dis-
cusses the immaterial costs driven by inadequate recognition of 
the disorder or supporting feigned complaints. The inadequate 
appreciation of the unethical background of factitious disorder 
forces many medical doctors to shy away from documenting and 
reporting cases, fearing being left alone and defenseless against 
aggressive legal prosecutions.
The current cultural climate of the legal system is largely out-
balanced in favor of the “victim” role play. Furthermore, threats 
of legal actions are not discouraged and not prosecuted as the 
reasoning goes that they cause no harm unless legal action is 
actually pursued. This interpretation does not take into account 
the disruption of medical activities that these behaviors cause. 
This disruption has direct costs, encompassing unjustified pro-
cedures, indirect costs for the emotional burden, and the waste of 
time devoted to providing a shield against fraudulent behaviors.
A revision of attitudes toward factitious disorder must rely 
on the unethical and anti-economic outcomes of this disrupted 
behavior, that is to gain undeserved benefits, no matter which 
the motivation is.
Undoubtedly, as shown by psychodynamic studies, in facti-
tious disorder, borders between volition and insight are dubi-
ous and blurred [1, 25]. Still, focusing the attention on practical 
outcomes rather than dynamics [1] leads to the notion that any 
complacency with the disordered behavior results in the pro-
vision of undeserved gain and outrageous costs and waste of 
public services and money.
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The unethical pretense for an undeserved gain enacted by 
patients with factitious disorders should be adequately recog-
nized as part of antisocial behavior.
When public health systems’ sustainability is on the brink of 
collapse, it seems fitting to ask for a shift of the cultural climate 
of legal systems toward an increased engagement of the medical 
professions and a proper consideration of immediate and long-
term costs of these disorders.
In the USA, it was calculated that the prevalence of factitious 
disorder/malingering is 10 to 30% of patients seeking compensa-
tion, with an estimated cost of $20 billion [20] per year.
As pointed out in the book by Feldman and Yates [6], the 
legal principles involved in disclosing factitious disorder are 
equivocal. The Hippocratic principles make no explicit refer-
ences to medical deception, despite the “How to detect those 
who feign diseases” was written by Galen of Pergamon almost 
1900 years ago [51]. The issue revolves around the authorization 
to breach patients’ confidentiality in cases of factitious illness. 
The authors of the book advise seeking legal consultation when 
danger is predictable and hope for a statement by medical asso-
ciations, like “In terms of our code of ethics, there are certain 
circumstances in which confidentiality no longer holds. These 
include situations in which patients or their caregivers have been 
fraudulent in producing information and/or have produced the 
diseases for which they seek treatment.” [6] Legislators must 
need to develop similar statutory language and judges to affirm 
its legality. Historically, however, every medical or legal issue 
has taken priority over consideration of factitious disorders [52].
As a concluding remark, we want to point out that the legal 
implications of factitious disorder may reach unforeseeable 
dimensions. Recently, patients with factitious disorder have suc-
cessfully produced allegations against physicians claiming that 
by not providing a definite diagnosis, they were responsible for 
unnecessary medical procedures.
We encourage a shift in attitude and a better understanding 
of the disorder and its outrageous financial and emotional costs. 
We also urge raising legal figures  [53] to protect doctors against 
fraudulent behaviors clearly intertwined with compensation 
aims as well as against futile allegations presented by plaintiff 
lawyers.
As a final note, we like to stress that the cases originating our 
fictionalization were not prosecuted.
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